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Life,1 we are t{)ld, imitates the World Series.2 This Even Further 
Aside3 tests the validity of that premise by exploring certain simi-
larities and differences between the Official Baseball Rules" and 
rules of somewhat broader application. Specifically, this Even Fur-
ther Aside will compare baseball's infield fly rule5 with function-
ally similar provisions of the Internal Revenue Code6 in order to 
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the contributions of Michael Ariens, a colleague and fellow baseball fan, and Carl Bjerre, a 
law student at Cornell University. 
1. On the meaning of life, or more specifically on the problem of defining the commence-
ment thereof, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-152 (1973). Cf. Welch v. Helvering, 290 
U.S. 111 (1933), in which Justice Cardozo suggested that "[l]ife in all its fullness must sup-
ply the answer to the riddle" of which business expenses are "ordinary and necessary" and 
therefore deductible. Id. at 115. 
2. T. BosWELL, How LIFE IMITATES THE WoRLD SERIES (1982). A. Bartlett Giamatti, presi-
dent of the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, has been quoted as saying that 
baseball "is more than just a sport. It is life itself." Chadwick, Baseball's Academician, AM. 
WAY, June 15, 1987, at 46. Although Mr. Giamatti's statement raises interesting philosophi-
cal issues, this Even Further Aside will pursue Mr. Boswell's more conservative assertion. 
The premise that life imitates baseball is, of course, a variation on the familiar truism that 
life imitates art (and vice versa). If life imitates both art and baseball, does it follow that 
baseball imitates art? Apparently not, according to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. In Wills v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969), the court held 
that a famous baseball player could not exclude from his gross income the value of awards 
he had received by claiming they were awards for "artistic achievement." Id. at 542. 
3. See Flynn, Further Aside: A Comment on "The Common Law Origins of The Infield 
Fly Rule," 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1978); Aside: The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly 
Rule, 123 U. P. L. REv. 1474 (1975) [hereinafter Aside]. Cf. G. LARSON, THE FAR SIDE (1982). 
4. COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES (1984). (hereinafter BASEBALL 
RULES). 
5. I d. rules 2.00, 6.05(e). Rule 6.05(e), which provides that a batter is out when he hits an 
infield fly, is the operative rule. Rule 2.00 defines the term 'infield fly' as "a fair fly ball (not 
including a line drive nor an attempted bunt) which can be caught by an infielder with 
ordinary effort, when first and second, or first, second, and third bases are occupied, before 
two are out." Id. rule 2.00. 
6. 26 u.s.c. §§ 267, 482 (1982). 
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determine the extent to which the national pastime7 mirrors other 
human endeavors. 
The infield fly rule can best be understood by considering its 
purpose: "[t]o prevent the defense from making a double play by 
subterfuge, at a time when the offense is helpless to prevent it, 
rather than by skill and speed."8 For example, assume that the 
team at bat has runners on first and second with one out. The bat-
ter pops up to the third baseman. Thinking the third baseman will 
catch the pop up, the base runners do not advance.9 The third 
baseman, however, allows the ball to fall to the ground, picks it up, 
touches third base to force out the runner from second, and throws 
the ball to the second baseman, who touches second base to force 
out the runner from first. Thus, a routine pop up has been con-
verted into a double play. 
The infield fly rule prevents this type of manipulation. In the 
situation described, the batter would be out, regardless of whether 
the ball was caught. The base runners would be free either to stay 
on their respective bases or to advance at their own risk.10 
The rule applies when runners are on base with less than two 
out and the ba~ter hits a fly ball that, in the umpire's judgment, 
could be caught with ordinary effort by an infielder.11 Once the 
umpire has determined that the ball is catchable and has an-
nounced the applicability of the rule, the result is automatic.12 Ab-
sent the infield fly rule, the base runners are faced with a Hobson's 
choice.14 If the runners stay on base, the infielder can let the ball 
drop and force a double play. If they advance, the infielder can 
7. Origin uncertain. 
8. Aside, supra note 3, at 1477 (citing 1 H. SEYMOUR, BASEBALL 276 (1960)). 
9. BASEBALL RULES, supra note 4. Rule 7.08(d) provides that a runner is out if "[h]e fails 
to retouch his base after a fair or foul ball is legally caught before he, or his base, is tagged 
by a fielder." !d. A base runner who attempts to advance on a pop fly usually can be put out 
easily if a fielder catches the pop fly. 
10. Id. Rule 2.00 provides that when the batter hits an infield fly, "the ball is alive and 
the runners may advance at the risk of the ball being caught, or retouch and advance after 
the ball is touched, the same as on any fly ball." Id. rule 2.00. 
11. See supra note 5. 
12. Id. 
14. "A choice without an alternative; the thing offered or nothing; so called in allusion to 
the practice of Thomas Hobson (d. 1631), at Cambridge, England, who let horses, and re-
quired every customer to take the horse which stood nearest the door." WEBSTER'S NEw 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1185 (2d ed. 1934). [Note: The author 
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catch the ball and "double off'' one or both runners.15 Thus, the 
infield fly rule prevents what would otherwise be a virtually auto-
matic double play. 
The question then becomes, why shouldn't a pop up to the in-
field with runners on base result in a double play? The answer, 
presumably, is that the defense would gain an "unfair" advan-
tage.16 In baseball as in life/7 fairness is an elusive concept that 
defies precise definition.18 In this context, the "unfairness" seems 
to derive from the infielder's ability to manipulate a situation 
without incurring any risk. Baseball is willing to countenance one 
easy out when the batter pops up. To allow the infielder to convert 
one easy out into two easy outs would be contrary to fundamental 
notions of fair play.19 In effect, the infielder would be shooting fish 
in a barrel. 
Some commentators have suggested that the infield fly rule 
would be unnecessary if all players behaved as "gentlemen."20 The 
suggestion may be correct, but it involves an unnecessary value 
judgment. Assuming the object of the game is to win,21 can one 
justly vilify the infielder for capitalizing on an opportunity to get 
two outs instead of one? Some might even call failure to make the 
easy double play a dereliction of duty.22 
has chosen to follow a time-honored baseball tradition and omit footnote 13 out of 
superstition.] 
15. See supra note 9. 
16. "Fair" in this context should not be confused with "fair" as distinguished from "foul," 
which distinction is set out in detail in rule 2.00. BASEBALL RuLES, supra note 4. Nor should 
"foul" be confused with "fowl," as discussed in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (the "sick chicken" case). Compare "Fair is foul, and foul is 
fair." W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, Act I, Scene I, in IX THE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 165 (C. 
Herford ed. 1903). 
17. See supra note 1. 
18. See supra note 16. 
19. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (construing 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as requiring fundamental fairness). 
20. Aside, supra note 3, at 1478-79; see, e.g., Pete Rose; cf. Kirby, The Year They Fixed 
the World Series, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 64 (describing the scandal surrounding the al-
leged "fixing" of the 1919 World Series by the Chicago White Sox). 
21. With respect to football, Vince Lombardi said, "Winning isn't everything, it's the only 
thing." J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QuOTATIONS 925 (15th ed. 1980). Leo Durocher said that in 
baseball, "[n]ice guys finish last." ld. at 867. 
22. Such a dereliction would not be ruled an error, however. Generally, failure to make a 
defensive play that could have been accomplished with reasonable effort constitutes an er-
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Without accusing the infielder of "unethical conduct,"23 the ob-
servation that at least some players will take advantage of the op-
portunity to engage in risk-free manipulation should suffice to ex-
plain the rule's existence. For purposes of this discussion, whether 
this tendency is attributable to a lack of ethics or an abundance of 
zeal is irrelevant. 
The existence of the infield fly rule demonstrates three princi-
ples. First, in certain situations, infielders are presented with the 
opportunity to engage in risk-free manipulation. Second, absent a 
rule preventing such manipulation, at least some infielders would 
take advantage of this opportunity. Finally, baseball perceives such 
manipulation as "unfair" and thus has endeavored to prevent it. 
At least two of these principles support the premise that baseball 
imitates life, and vice versa. First, life is full of opportunities for 
risk-free manipulation. Second, at least some people can be ex-
pected to take advantage of those opportunties.24 To determine 
whether the third principle reflects a similarity between baseball 
and life, however, one must consider examples of society's response 
to risk-free manipulation. 
One of the more blatant real world examples of the "manipula-
tion without risk" phenomenon can be found in the realm of fed-
eral taxation. Like the astute infielder who sees the opportunity to 
convert a pop up into a double play, the taxpayer who engages in a 
financial transaction with a related party confronts an almost irre-
sistible temptation to manipulate the situation. For example, as-
sume that Owner is about to sell a property to Ownerco, a corpora-
tion. Owner owns all the stock of Ownerco. If Owner sells the 
property for its true value, she will realize a gain, which will in-
crease her federal income tax liability.25 If Owner sells the property 
ror, but for this purpose the assumption is never that the double play could be made with 
reasonable effort. Whether a transgression is an error is of no significance to the outcome of 
the game; it is relevant solely for statistical purposes. 
23. Aside, supra note 3, at 1478. 
24. See "playing both sides against the middle," "taking candy from a baby," "having 
one's cake and eating it, too," and "stacking the deck"; cf. "hedging one's bet," which con-
notes minimizing risk rather than eliminating it. 
25. Generally, a taxpayer selling property will recognize a gain to the extent that the sales 
proceeds (the "amount realized") exceed the amount the taxpayer paid for the property (its 
"basis"). I.R.C. § 1001 (CCH 1988). 
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to Ownerco for less than its full value, she will recognize less gain 
or perhaps even a loss.26 
Whether Ownerco pays full value for the property is immaterial 
to Owner because she owns the stock of Ownerco. To the extent 
that Ownerco pays less than full value, the value of Owner's stock 
will increase cgrrespc;mdingly because the corporatign will have 
parted with less cash and acquired more property. Consequently, 
like the infielder who lets the pop fly drop in order to make a 
double play, Owner can manipulate the situation to her advantage 
without incurring any real cost. 27 
Federal tax law, like the rules of baseball, recognizes and re-
sponds to the "manipulation without risk" phenomenon. In 
Owner's case, section ·267 of the Internal Revenue Code deals with 
the situation by denying a deduction for any loss on a sale by 
Owner to Ownerco.28 As with the infield fly rule, the result under 
section 267 is automatic. 29 Any loss incurred on a sale to a related 
party is disallowed. Unlike the infield fly rule, however, section 267 
is automatic in application as well as in result. The Commissioner30 
is granted no discretion in determining when the statute applies. If 
one of the statutorily specified relationships31 exists, the loss is dis-
allowed. In effect, the taxpayer is conclusively presumed to have 
the ability to manipulate without risk when dealing with a related 
party.32 By contrast, the infield fly rule requires the umpire to ex-
ercise his or her judgment to determine whether the pop up "can 
be caught by an infielder with ordinary effort."33 
26. A loss will result if the amount realized is less than the taxpayer's basis. I d. The loss 
will be deductible if it arises out of a transaction entered into for profit, as described in 
I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (CCH 1988). 
27. Cf. supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
28. I.R.C. § 267 (CCH 1988). Section 267 provides, in pertinent part, that no deduction 
shall be allowed in respect of any loss from the sale or exchange of property between certain 
related persons, including controlling shareholders and their corporations. 
29. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
30. That baseball and federal taxation both function under the supervision of a commis-
sioner demonstrates yet another similarity between the two. 
31. The statute covers sales between siblings, spouses, ancestors, or lineal descendants as 
well as sales between entities and parties having an interest therein. I.R.C. § 267(b). 
32. Of course, this presumption is not always justified, but Congress apparently has con-
cluded that the exceptional cases are so rare that a conclusive presumption is acceptable. 
33. See supra note 5. 
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A finding that an infielder can catch a pop up with ordinary ef-
fort is a justifiable prerequisite to the application of the infield fly 
rule, because the opportunity for manipulation does not exist un-
less the infielder can choose between catching the ball and letting 
it drop. If a pop up would require more than ordinary effort to 
catch, any resulting double play would be a legitimate product of 
"skill and speed"34 rather than the spoils of risk-free manipulation. 
By analogy, section 267 arguably should require a determination 
either that the sale between related parties is an unfair bargain or 
that the seller has retained an indirect interest in the property. 
Such a finding is not required, however, probably in order to avoid 
the litigation that inevitably would follow.35 The Commissioner's36 
findings of fact, unlike those of the umpire, are reviewable.37 Thus, 
the absence of a fact-finding requirement in section 267 promotes 
efficiency by avoiding litigation of factual questions. In baseball, on 
the other hand, a factual requisite to the application of a rule is 
workable because the umpire is the ultimate finder of fact.38 
The availability of judicial review of factual findings in federal 
tax matters, and the lack thereof in baseball, reflects a difference 
in the nature of the respective fact-finding processes, which in turn 
reflects a difference in the activities themselves. In baseball, the 
umpire is present for every play and makes a finding of fact with 
respect to every transaction. 39 This is possible because baseball . 
consists of a series of discrete transactions occurring within clearly · 
marked boundaries. Consequently, each play can be evaluated in-
dependently. By contrast, real life is a continuous, evolutionary se-
34. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
35. But see infra note 48 and accompanying text, discussing I.R.C. § 482. 
36. See supra note 30. 
37. An umpire's application of a rule may be protested, but factual determinations by the 
umpire are final. BASEBALL RuLES, supra note 4, rule 4.19. But see infra note 57 regarding 
the now infamous "pine tar game." 
38. BASEBALL RULES, supra note 4, rule 4.19. 
39. The umpire's omniscience as fact finder is illustrated by the following colloquy, of 
unknown origin: 
Umpire No. One: "I call 'em like I see 'em." 
Umpire No. Two: "They ain't anything until I call 'em." 
Bill Klem, a former major league umpire, is credited with saying, "I never called one 
wrong." In view of the finality accorded the unpire's decisions, it is hard to argue with 
Klem's claim. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We 
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final"). 
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ries of events that are related in ways not always readily evident. 
These events transpire not between chalk lines but in countless 
boardrooms, back alleys, and business establishments.40 The Com-
missioner cannot possibly make factual determinations with re-
spect to more than a small fraction of the transactions that occur.41 
Because the Commissioner makes findings of fact in only a small 
number of cases, judicial review of those findings is at least feasi-
ble.42 In baseball, in which every play involves a finding of fact qy 
the umpire, review of fact findings would be unworkable. Games 
would be have to be suspended pending the resolution of factual 
disputes, or else they would have to be replayed.43 When a sched-
ule must be completed, a prompt and final determination is as im-
portant as a correct determination. 44 
The Commissioner's inability to be present at the time of a taxa-
ble transaction, together with the impossibility of investigating 
more than a small number of tax returns, creates a climate condu-
cive to manipulation.4~> Particularly when related business entities 
engage in transactions with one another, taxpayers face a great 
temptation to arrange those transactions, at least superficially, in a 
manner that yields an advantageous tax result.46 Section 267, 
which deals specifically with sales of property, reaches only a nar-
row segment of the manipulation-without-risk problem inherent in 
such transactions. In fact, no statute could adequately address all 
40. See, e.g., Blanche E. Lane, 25 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) 11 56,209 (1956) (profits from 
prostitution are includible in gross income). 
41. Overall, less than two percent of tax returns receive a full-scale audit. CoMM'R & 
CHIEF CouNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1984 ANN. REP. 13. 
42. But see Tannenwald, Reflections on the Tax Court, 36 TAX LAW. 853 (1982-1983) 
(commenting on the Tax Court's burgeoning caseload). 
43. See infra note 57. Cf. BASEBALL RULEs, supra note 4, rule 4.19, which provides for 
games to be continued under protest when a manager claims that an umpire's decision is 
inconsistent with the rules. Professional football, on the other hand, has begun to experi-
ment with on-the-spot review of referees' factual determinations. See Taaffe, It's Super Ref 
to the Rescue, Sports llius. (special ed.), Sept. 3, 1986, at 160. One would hope that baseball 
will not lower itself to such a level. If baseball imitates football, life cannot be far behind, 
and when life starts to imitate football, civilization as we know it will cease to exist. 
44. See Aside, supra note 3, at 1480. 
45. "When the cat is away, [t]he mice will play." W. BENHAM, PUTNAM'S DICTIONARY OF 
THoUGHTS 870b (1930). See supra note 24. 
46. See W. BENHAM, supra note 45, at 870b; supra note 24. 
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the possible opportunities for manipulation:n Instead of attempt-
ing to identify and deal with all such situations, Congress chose to 
endow the Commissioner with considerable discretion both to 
identify and to remedy manipulation by related business entities. 
This grant of discretion appears in section 482, which authorizes 
the Commissioner48 to re-allocate gross income, deductions, cred-
its, or allowances among business entities owned or controlled by 
the same interests if the Commissioner determines that such a re-
allocation is necessary "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or 
clearly to reflect the income" of any businesses.49 
As with the infield fly rule, a factual determination must precede 
the application of section 482. This factual determination is less 
clear cut, however, because the term "controlled" is not defined.50 
Moreover, unlike the umpire, the Commissioner is not required to 
exercise his or her discretion in any given case. Section 482 also 
differs from the infield fly rule in result. Rather than an automatic 
result (that is, the batter is out), section 482 authorizes a discre-
tionary allocation of income, deductions, credits, or allowances 
among the various commonly controlled businesses.C>I 
Because the exercise of discretion invites judicial review, effi-
ciency necessarily is compromised when discretion is granted. 52 
47. Virtually any business transaction is potentially susceptible to manipulation. When-
ever one entity provides goods or services to a related entity, the tax effect of the transac-
tion can be distorted by charging either more or less than the actual value of the goods or 
services. If the same financial interests control both entities, the amount charged is immate-
rial to the overall result. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Cf. "To rob Peter 
and pay Paul." The expression "is said to have had its origin in the reign of Edward IV 
when the lands of St. Peter at Westminster were appropriated to raise money for the repair 
of St. Paul's in London." J. BARTLE'IT, supra note 21, at 160 n.2. The phrase "to robbe Peter 
and paie Poule" appears in JOHN HEYWOOD's A Dialogue of Proverbs 120 (R. Habenicht ed. 
1963). 
48. See supra note 30. The Internal Revenue Code actually grants the authority to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, who delegates it to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. I.R.C. 
§ 482 (CCH 1988). 
49. Id. 
50. The regulations provide that "[t]he term 'controlled' includes any kind of control, 
direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised," adding 
that "[a] presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been arbitrarily 
shifted." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3) (1987). 
51. I.R.C. § 482. The Internal Revenue Code rarely grants discretion comparable to that 
allowed by section 482. 
52. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
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The type of discretion granted through section 482 is necessary, 
however, because the Commissioner is not present at the time of 
the transaction and must make his or her findings after the fact.l13 
An absentee fact finder invites the type of manipulation that can-
not be undone by the application of fixed rules.u In baseball, in 
which the fact finder is always present, the players' conduct can be 
monitored more closely. 
In any event, a rule giving the umpire discretion comparable to 
that afforded by section 482 would be unworkable.55 Just as the 
umpire's findings of fact must be final, his or her discretion must 
be minimal. 58 Since the exercise of such discretion would be re-
viewable, such discretion must be granted sparingly lest the sum-
mer schedule degenerate into a litigation docket.57 In the context 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
54. See· supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
55. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
56. Id. 
57. A now infamous episode involving George Brett of the Kansas City Royals illustrates 
the potential consequences of a seemingly minor exercise of discretion by an umpire. In a 
game against the Yankees in New York on July 24, 1983, Brett came to bat with two out in 
the top of the ninth inning. The Royals were behind 4-3, and one man was on base. Brett hit 
a home run, putting the Royals ahead 5-4. Yankee Manager Billy Martin pointed out to the 
umpire that the pine tar on Brett's bat handle extended beyond the allowable limit of 18 
inches. The umpire agreed with Martin, disallowed Brett's home run, and called Brett out 
to end the inning and the game. 
Two alternate theories support the umpire's decision. First, under rule 6.06(d), a batter is 
out when he uses or attempts to use a bat that, in the umpire's judgment, has been altered 
or tampered with to improve the distance factor or cause an unusual reaction to the base-
ball. OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULEs, supra note 4, rule 6.06(d) (emphasis added). The alternate 
theory for calling Brett out is based on rule 1.10(b), which, prior to 1984, provided: 
The bat handle, for not more than 18 inches from the end, may be covered 
or treated with any material (including pine tar) to improve the grip. Any such 
material, including pine tar, which extends past the 18 inch limitation, in the 
umpire's judgment, shall cause the bat to be removed from the game. No such 
material shall improve the reaction or distance factor of the bat. 
CoMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULEs 1.10(b) (1983) (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the apparent propriety of the umpire's ruling, four days later, American 
League President Lee MacPhail overruled the umpire's decision and allowed the home run 
to stand. MacPhail concluded that the pine tar had been applied to the bat to improve 
Brett's grip (an allowable alteration) rather than to alter the baseball's reaction to the bat (a 
prohibited alteration). According to MacPhail, even though the umpire's ruling was "techni-
cally defensible," Brett had not violated the "spirit" of the rule. 
In light of MacPhail's decision, the game had to be resumed three weeks later. The game 
began where it had left off-with the Royals at bat with two out in the top of the ninth, 
leading 5-4. When play resumed, the Yankees alleged that Brett had failed to touch first 
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of section 482, on the other hand, discretion and the consequent 
potential for litigation are accepted as necessary evils, because no 
realistic alternative exists for dealing with the manipulation-with-
out-risk phenomenon. 
The finality of the umpire's findings of fact and the application 
of arbitrary rules instead of case-by-case discretion, when com-
pared with tax law's provisions for judicial review and significant 
grants of discretion, might lead to the conclusion that baseball pre-
fers efficiency over justice.118 Such a conclusion, however, overlooks 
the fact that the participants have willingly submitted to the rules. 
Baseball is played in a controlled environment and is governed by 
agreed-on conventions. In short, baseball is a game. 
Having reached that unsettling conclusion, does it follow that 
the original premise of this Even Further Aside is false? This au-
thor thinks not. The premise was not that life and baseball are 
identical, but simply that they imitate each other.119 The existence 
of functionally similar manipulation-without-risk rules in baseball 
and federal taxation indicates that substantial similarities do exist. 
Baseball, like life, presents opportunities for risk-free manipula-
tion. In baseball, as in life, some people can be expected to take 
advantage of such opportunities. By attempting to prevent such 
manipulation through written rules, baseball, like society in gen-
eral, has indicated a disapproval of risk-free manipulation. The 
difference in operation between the infield fly rule on the one hand 
and sections 267 and 482 of the Internal Revenue Code on the 
other does not necessarily reflect a fundamental difference between 
base on his home run circuit. Martin's idea was that even if Brett had touched first base, 
the umpiring crew working the resumed game was not the same crew that had worked the 
original game and thus they could not determine whether Brett had touched first base on 
the previous play. The umpires had anticipated Martin's gamesmanship, however, and pro-
duced a notarized letter from the original umpiring crew indicating that Brett had indeed 
touched all the bases. The game then proceded to an anticlimactic finish, with the last bat-
ter in the top of the ninth and the first three batters in the bottom of the ninth being 
retired in order. 
The details of the "pine tar game" are set out in Wulf, Pine-Tarred and Feathered, 
SPORTS ILI.us., Aug. 29, 1983, at 48. For a more detailed legal analysis, see Commentary, In 
re Brett: The Sticky Problem of Statutory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 430 (1983). 
For a criticism of MacPhail's action in overruling the umpire, see McCarthy, Bad Calls, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 29, 1983, at 9, 10-11. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
59. Cf. Chadwick, supra note 2. 
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baseball and real life. Rather, this difference is indicative of the 
fact that baseball is a controlled, condensed version of real life. As 
one commentator has put it more eloquently: "Baseball is to our 
everyday experience what poetry often is to common speech-a 
slightly elevated and concentrated form."60 
60. T. BoswELL, supra note 2, at 6. 
